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Sustaining Reform Efforts at the SEC:
A Progress Report
Joan MacLeod Heminway

M

any recent articles written by U.S. legal practitioners and law scholars in the wake of the
financial crisis address regulatory reforms included in
or omitted from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank
Act”)1 and related agency initiatives. In contrast, this
article focuses on institutional reforms—specifically
those instituted at the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) since President Barack Obama
took office in January 2009.2 In that same month,
President Obama appointed Mary Schapiro as the
new Chairman of the SEC. She was summarily
and unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate and
sworn into office before month’s end.3 Less than one
month later, Chairman Schapiro appointed Robert
Khuzami the Director of the beleaguered and
maligned SEC Division of Enforcement.4 Together,
Schapiro and Khuzami, along with other SEC leaders, began the process of reforming an agency under
fire as a result of, among other things, its failure to
earlier catch and punish Bernard Madoff and control behavior that contributed to the U.S. and global
financial crises.
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In a recent article published in the Villanova Law
Review,5 I assessed the early reform efforts at the SEC
in the Obama era from the vantage point of change
leadership literature (a branch of business management scholarship). Change leadership literature, which
is based on analyses of organizational change in forprofit business associations, makes a number of claims
about change leaders and their efforts in promoting
and accomplishing transformation in business firms.
Although I began my inquiry and research with a
pessimistic attitude about reform efforts at the SEC,
I found that Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami
exhibited attributes of capable change leaders and had
engaged in activities consistent with successful change
leadership.
This article updates the preliminary findings
reported in the Villanova Law Review article in light
of the enactment and initial phases of implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act (which was in the final
stages of congressional action when work on the
article was completed in the spring of 2010) and the
subsequent change in the composition of Congress as
a result of the mid-term elections in November 2010.
I begin by identifying and assessing ongoing evidence
of effective change leadership at the SEC in accordance with the framework used in my earlier article
and continue by addressing the potential effects of
shortfalls in SEC funding. The article then concludes
by making tentative predictions about the future of
institutional reform at the SEC in this new political
environment.
Ongoing Evidence of Successful
Change Leadership at the SEC
The Villanova Law Review article captures two elements from change leadership literature to frame an
assessment of recent reform efforts at the SEC: the
attributes of successful change leaders and the nature
and quality of their actions. This part includes a brief
summary of the salient points of each element and
my earlier assessment of the SEC’s reform leaders and
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efforts based on each element, followed by updated
information benchmarking the SEC’s transformation at
the time work on this article was completed—almost
one year later. The evidence I review here dates from
May 2010 (when the basic provisions in the DoddFrank Act were reasonably complete) through early
March 2011 and is drawn exclusively from public
presentations and reports. Although public evidence
on SEC reform efforts is, by its nature, incomplete and
somewhat evanescent, it provides a window on the
agency’s transformation process.
The Attributes of Successful
Change Leaders
Wartime Leaders
I first address the contention that successful leaders
are “wartime leaders” who leverage difficult circumstances into targeted action through, among other
methods, persuasive communication to and with those
within the institution.6 In the Villanova Law Review
article, I assessed, based on publicly available resources,
the leadership attributes of both Chairman Schapiro
and Director Khuzami and concluded that:
[w]hile it may be too early to tell, both do exhibit
characteristics of wartime leaders. Both moved
quickly to identify focused reform initiatives and
begin implementing changes that addressed the
existing lack of public confidence in the SEC;
both have prioritized the implementation of
reform proposals and focused the organization
around those priorities, and both have shown persuasive communication skills. The SEC leadership
has conducted a self-assessment of the Division
of Enforcement as part of its reform strategy, and
Director Khuzami has revisited the effects of the
resulting decisions with the Division’s employees.
Current indications support the conclusion that
both Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami
are wartime leaders.7
Like wartime leaders, each identified and advocated
persuasively for specific organizational change initiatives and took targeted actions to achieve the desired
institutional adjustments. SEC staff members were
engaged with and in the process; they knew about the
change efforts and they aligned their collective energy
behind those efforts.
2 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

Since I made those observations, compelling rhetoric
about the need for and urgency of reform efforts has
continued. At the CFA Institute Annual Conference in
May 2010, Chairman Schapiro noted that part of the
SEC’s renewed mission of ensuring high-quality disclosures to investors “involves re-energizing, re-structuring
and refocusing the SEC itself, so that we have the tools
and skills necessary to analyze the data filed with us, and
the resources and the will to punish those who provide
false or misleading information.”8 Similarly, in July, she
reminded us that SEC staff, “during the past 18 months,
in addition to addressing a number of longstanding gaps
in regulation, . . .worked to strengthen the SEC at every
level and are hitting the ground running on financial regulatory reform.”9 More recently, congressional testimony
given by Chairman Schapiro in February cataloged plans
for new SEC offices required to be established under
the Dodd-Frank Act.10 Most recently, in March 2011,
in testimony before two subcommittees of the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Chairman Schapiro highlighted
key reforms that the SEC has accomplished under her
leadership and indicated her support for ongoing change
initiatives provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act:
Although we have made progress in reforming the
Commission, we continue to seek ways to improve
our operations. Section 967 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act . . . directed the agency to engage the services
of an independent consultant to study a number
of specific areas of SEC operations. During the
past four months, our staff has been fully engaged
with the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), participating in interviews, providing documentation,
and responding to questions. BCG’s report will
be released to Congress soon, and I expect that it
will include recommendations that will identify
additional efficiencies for the agency’s operations.
I look forward to implementing those and any
others that will improve the way we operate and
enhance our ability to fulfill our mission.11
The BCG report was released that same day.12
Although the law mandated the assessment provided
in the report, it has the capacity (like the earlier selfassessment of the Division of Enforcement) to reinforce
communication lines relevant to targeted investments
in reform.13
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Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1859045
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859045

Problem-Finders
Research on change leadership also points to the
importance of “problem-finders” in organizational
change. Problem-finders are people who actively
engage in questioning their organization as a means of
identifying potential trouble or weaknesses in advance.
They tend to exhibit one or more of seven characteristics, all of which involve a futuristic, forward-looking
approach to leadership.14 In the spring of 2010, when
my work on the Villanova Law Review article was
completed, public evidence of Chairman Schapiro’s
and Director Khuzami’s problem-finding skills was
somewhat equivocal. On the positive side, I noted that
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami initiated a
self-assessment to identify problems in the Enforcement
Division at the SEC before they create or allow failures
in investor protection or market integrity.15 Yet, there
were no clear signs that a problem-finding mentality
pervaded our SEC leadership.
The public evidence of problem-finding proficiencies in our SEC leaders continues to be mixed. In
one recent article, a commentator queried whether
Chairman Schapiro “has factored in the unintended
consequences of the agency’s new activist tilt,”16
concluding:
While it’s not reasonable to require Schapiro and
the SEC to ponder every conceivable ramification
of their new activism, they should demonstrate
that they are prepared not only to govern the
financial system more forcefully, but also to cope
with the less desirable results of that, as well as to
celebrate the upside.17
Obvious defects in the agency that create perverse
incentives continue to exist. For example, Chairman
Schapiro and Director Khuzami have not remedied
evident negative aspects of the SEC organization that
create the potential for conflicting interests and agency
capture.18 In particular, the SEC and Chairman Schapiro
have been criticized for allowing former SEC General
Counsel David Becker to work on the Bernard Madoff
affair after his disclosure that he inherited proceeds
from an investment his mother made with Madoff.19
Chairman Schapiro herself noted that she failed to look
“around the next corner” in allowing Becker to continue to participate in the SEC’s Madoff matters.20 Also,
the SEC staff may be beholden to the very businesses
Volume 30 • Number 4 • April 2011

the SEC exists to regulate, since the logical (and most
lucrative) job path for them is to move into compliance
and other roles at investment banks, law firms, and large
public company issuers after a few years of work at the
SEC.21 The failure of the SEC to address ongoing concerns about this employment pattern also may evidence
a leadership failure to problem-find. However, the probable alternative to permitting staff to move into these
highly paid private sector jobs, effectively forcing staff
members to retain jobs as underpaid career bureaucrats,
is unappealing for many (not to mention the effects this
might have on attracting talent to SEC staff positions),
and it may be unrealistic to expect that even a good
change leader would constrain the natural tendency of
staff to maximize personal financial benefits and status.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami are forward-looking in their approach in a way that may
indicate pervasive problem-finding abilities. For example, Director Khuzami has been praised for taking an
approach that endeavors to deter, as well as punish,
fraud.
Khuzami’s supporters say [he] has transformed
the division into one focused on “bad behavior
that’s fresh” as opposed to fraud that occurred
even during the housing bubble. While the SEC
is still focusing on the Lehman bankruptcy, staff
attorneys are looking for new cases and trying
to close them quicker, because Khuzami believes
speed has a greater deterrent value on would-be
fraudsters.22
It still may be too soon to tell whether Chairman
Schapiro and Director Khuzami have sufficient problemfinding acumen to enable true reform at the SEC.
However, we can safely say that their actions indicate
that they are paying heed to the past in constructing a
better vision for the future.23 They are widely praised
as better leaders than their predecessors, even if they
cannot yet be definitively labeled effective leaders of
change.24
The Nature and Quality of the Actions
of Successful Change Leaders
There is a vast literature on the patterns of activity
that create successful transformation in organizations.
In my Villanova Law Review article, I chose to address
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 3
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three scholarly perspectives on how change leaders successfully implement organizational reform. These three
perspectives are summarized and illustrated in the pages
that follow.
Full Implementation of John Kotter’s
Eight-Stage Framework
Successful change leaders understand and effectively
employ recognized stages of successful organizational
change. Harvard professor emeritus John Kotter has
identified eight stages, ranging from the establishment
of a sense of urgency about making change to the
inculcation of change into the organization’s culture.25
I observed in the Villanova Law Review article that, in
their early change efforts, both Chairman Schapiro
and Director Khuzami appeared to engage Kotter’s
eight stages of successful organizational change. The
first six stages were seemingly employed by each,
perhaps even consciously. Specifically, I found public
evidence that Chairman Schapiro and Director
Khuzami established a sense of urgency about organizational change at the SEC, created a guiding
coalition to implement change initiatives, developed
a vision and strategy for the achievement of change,
communicated the change vision within and outside
the organization, empowered broad-based action to
make the needed adjustments, and generated shortterm wins to foster and sustain the necessary change
momentum.26 The last two stages—consolidating
gains and producing more change and anchoring new
approaches in the culture—appeared to be in process
or at least contemplated.27
Now that almost a year has passed since that assessment, it is important to ask whether Chairman Shapiro
and Director Khuzami are actively engaging the last
two stages of Kotter’s eight-stage pattern for successful
organizational change. Is there a continued sense of
urgency at the SEC . . . or complacency? In May 2010,
Chairman Schapiro indicated that the SEC was, in fact,
sustaining change efforts by consolidating the gains it
had made and producing further change.
The initial focus of my time at the SEC has been
re-energizing the agency itself.We’ve changed our
internal structure, breaking down silos that limited
communications between and among offices and
divisions and which contributed to missteps in
the past.
4 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

For the first time in years, our budget allows us to
begin investing significantly in new technology.
Our priority has been to create a system that can
track, classify and correlate the thousands of tips
and investigative leads we receive every month,
and which are often the first step towards preventing or punishing fraud.
We brought in new leadership, and they’re bringing in new talent, across the organization.28
These remarks were echoed in (among other public
presentations) a speech given by Chairman Schapiro
in November 2010 and congressional testimony in
March 2011.29
In addition, in July 2010, the SEC announced
changes to the structure of its Division of Corporation
Finance and the promotion of an internal candidate to
the new position of Deputy Director for Policy and
Capital Markets.30 The Chairman’s remarks and these
announcements indicate that the SEC continues to
focus on identifying and securing new leaders, promoting changes from existing leaders, recruiting new
leaders, and removing structural barriers to continued
change, all of which (according to Kotter) are attributes
of an organization that is consolidating the gains it
has made and producing further change.31 Chairman
Schapiro’s overall efforts were praised in remarks made
by SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter in September
2010.
Our Chairman, Mary Schapiro, has worked tirelessly to bring to rest a number of long-standing
issues . . . , and I, for one, am very thankful for
all her hard work and proud to have served at
her side as the Commission has accomplished so
much. The song goes—What a Difference a Day
Makes—but I would say (if I sang, you would run
from the room in horror)—What a Difference a
Year and a Half Makes.
Yet, with each step that we take, it seems that there
continue to be those who wish to fight the last
fight. I want you to know that this Commissioner
is committed to moving forward. As the investor’s
advocate, I believe that it is our job at the SEC to
move forward with a 21st century investor protection mission.32
Volume 30 • Number 4 • April 2011
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More recently, in March 2011, Chairman Schapiro
noted the new leadership installed in various roles at
the SEC and then offered in that vein that the SEC is
“continuing to make significant progress in reforming
how the SEC operates,” before illustrating how the
SEC would use appropriated funds in 2012.33 It appears
from these pubic presentations and reports that early
changes at the SEC during the Schapiro chairmanship
have been shored up and that the change momentum
has continued.
Is the SEC anchoring new approaches in its culture,
as described in the final stage of Kotter’s model? An
effective change leader needs to ensure that changes
are being aligned with behavioral norms and values of
and within units at the SEC. In the wake of very public criticism of the agency during the recent financial
crisis, the prevailing norms and values at the SEC were
in question. As a result, Chairman Schapiro had to, in
effect, re-create a culture before she could root things
in it. She responded to this need by expressly refocusing the agency around investor advocacy and protection
and tied changes to those foundational values.34
[B]y focusing on basics—strengthening our infrastructure and focusing on our core mission, we
have made real progress. And, by matching the
markets’ commitment to innovation and progress
with our own drive to protect investors and excel,
we are becoming an ever-more effective advocate
for investors, in a very complicated time.35
Investor advocacy and protection comprise additional
values, such as transparency and fairness.36 Investor
advocacy and protection and their embedded values
collectively constitute the central historical core of the
SEC, dating back to the 1930s.37 Institutional reform
anchored in those values has a greater probability of
success under Kotter’s framework, and it appears that
Chairman Schapiro has made strides in tying her vision
for and actions involving institutional change to it.
Recently, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar reinforced and deepened Chairman Schapiro’s message
(linking reform to investor primacy) by denominating
a set of five principles that underlie the SEC’s investor
advocacy and protection values in connection with the
SEC’s early implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
provisions.
Volume 30 • Number 4 • April 2011

As the SEC moves to comply with the new requirements, I will articulate a few fundamental principles
that should guide its decision-making. These are:
• Investor Protections Should Be Real and
Verifiable;
• The SEC Must Always Actively Seek Investor
Input;
• The SEC Should Resist the Trend Toward
Establishing a Two-Tier Market;
• The SEC Should Use its Authority and Expertise; and
• The SEC Must Vigorously Enforce the Rules.38
This set of principles refines the SEC’s historic investor advocacy and protection mission in the current
environment and is further evidence of an express connection between the SEC’s institutional and regulatory
reform efforts and that mission. The principles signal a
clear anchoring of new approaches in the fundamental
elements of the culture of the agency.
Treatment of the Organization As a Living Being
The literature of change leadership also credits successful change leaders with treating the organization
as a living creature rather than a machine.39 An organization is a collection of individuals who have the
capacity to act individually—with a certain amount of
free will—rather than a system of people with narrowly
defined and consistently executed roles.40 Accordingly,
change leaders must ensure comprehensive buy-in to
the change vision and collective action to achieve it as
among the individuals in the organization.41
In the Villanova Law Review article, I assessed the
reform efforts of SEC leaders in this regard based
on four principles.42 First, I found that Chairman
Schapiro and Director Khuzami understood that
participation is not a choice (requiring two-way
communication to achieve buy-in) and acted in a
manner consistent with that principle.43 Both leaders
listened to staff concerns and responded with targeted
reforms; they involved staff with their plans for change.44
I also observed some evidence that Chairman Schapiro
and Director Khuzami valued differences in reactions to
change and leveraged the individual responses to their
reforms into collective action; they seemed to acknowledge that life always reacts to directives rather than
obeying them and to comprehend that each person’s
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 5
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view of reality is unique and that there must be disclosure and dialog in order to assure forward momentum.45
Finally, I noted that their overall approach recognized
that successful change in organizations results from
the creation of and support for new interconnections
between and among those working in the institution,
fully utilizing the collective expertise of the organization’s constituents.46 In these ways, Chairman Schapiro
and Director Khuzami appeared to be treating the SEC
as a living organism rather than a static machine.
There is evidence that this approach has continued
through 2010 and into 2011. Public rhetoric indicates
that SEC leaders continue to engage the staff in dialogue about institutional change, value and work with
those with different perspectives, foster disclosure and
dialogue about the change efforts, and connect and
reconnect members of the SEC staff to each other to
encourage and maintain reform. In an October Speech,
SEC Commissioner Aguilar reminded the audience
that Congress delegated the tough choices in how to
implement various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
to the Commissioners and staff.
[I]t is the expertise of the Commission in the
securities industry and in the investment adviser
arena that will inform the development of these
rules and requirements. It is the Commission staff
that will write the text of the rules and provide
the practical guidance of how this regime will
work.47
The October speech substantially repeats, in this
respect, remarks he made in an earlier speech at Loyola
Marymount University.48
As change at the SEC has continued, Chairman
Schapiro has shown that she has the capacity to alter
her reform efforts in response to administrative and staff
concerns. Over a year ago, she changed the reporting
line for SEC economists from herself to a subordinate.49
She lost two economists after making this decision, one
of whom, the former chief economist, later said that
the restructuring contributed to his decision to leave
the agency.50 In recent announcements, Chairman
Schapiro has noted that the new chief economist will
report directly to her.51 This is strong evidence that she
is not treating the SEC like a machine as she navigates
institutional change.
6 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

Chairman Schapiro also has continued to connect
the SEC back to itself as a means of ensuring the overall
health of the SEC and the stability and continuity of
its change efforts. In May 2010, she noted that she and
other SEC leaders have “changed our internal structure, breaking down silos that limited communications
between and among offices and divisions and which
contributed to missteps in the past.”52
The recent examination of SEC operations conducted by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG),53
required under the Dodd-Frank Act, re-engaged the
SEC’s staff in the ongoing reform dialogue (by incorporating staff input54) and, in the process, accorded credit
to diverse viewpoints, encouraged transparency and
feedback relating to ongoing reforms, and reconnected
members of the SEC staff to the agency and its efforts to
transform itself.55 Although the study was conducted by
a third party engaged by the SEC rather than directly by
the SEC leadership, the work done by BCG re-enforced
and extended earlier work done by SEC leaders in their
self-assessments of aspects of SEC operations. The common element of these efforts is staff engagement in the
organizational change process, as opposed to top-down
imposition of reforms—the treatment of the SEC as a
living system, not a machine.
In sum, Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami
have actively engaged the SEC staff in the change process by understanding that the SEC is a fluid collection
of individuals rather than a predictable, mechanized
system. They appear to be encouraging and maintaining reform efforts by following the four principles that
underlie the treatment of an organization as an organic
living thing: engaging the staff in dialogue about institutional change, valuing and working with those with
different perspectives, fostering disclosure and dialogue
about the change efforts, and connecting and reconnecting people in the SEC to each other.
Use of a Multi-Frame Analysis
The Villanova Law Review article summarizes and
cites to a 1999 article written by Professors Lee
Bolman and Terry Deal for yet a third construct for
examining change leadership. In their article, Bolman
and Deal set out four frames of analysis used by successful change leaders and assert that all four should be
used in strategizing and implementing organizational
change.56
Volume 30 • Number 4 • April 2011
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The first frame, the “human resources frame,” comprises an attention to “needs and skills.”57 In the
Villanova Law Review article, I note that the training
afforded to SEC staffers as part of the SEC’s reform
efforts showed an attention to the human resources
frame.58 The SEC’s Web site indicates that training
programs are ongoing and increasing in scope.59 In a
recent speech, Chairman Schapiro praised the efforts of
the SEC staff during the past year.
[O]ver the past year, I saw true public servants
continue to perform under significant pressure
and under an intense spotlight.
I’ve seen them roll up their sleeves to figure out
what caused the market disruption of May 6th.
I’ve seen them bring some of the most complicated enforcement actions and reach record
settlements. And, I’ve seen them work long hours
to fulfill their new responsibilities for derivatives,
hedge funds and credit rating agencies.60
Her attentiveness to training and motivating staff in
the reform efforts arguably has been an important element in achieving and motivating continuing change.
The SEC also has focused on hiring to increase
quality, supplement and deepen areas of expertise,
and enhance diversity.61 The appointment of Eileen
Rominger as the Director of the SEC’s Division
of Investment Management is a prominent recent
example.62 Even given limited resources available for
new personnel, the SEC undoubtedly will have to continue to hire new administrators and staff both to fill
vacancies and to meet new regulatory needs in response
to the Dodd-Frank Act.
The human resources frame has been significant in
the SEC’s reform efforts to date and continues to be
a showcase item for Chairman Schapiro in describing
operational changes. In recent congressional testimony
summarizing these changes, she noted that, since her
appointment, the SEC had “brought in new leadership and senior management in virtually every office,
including the Commission’s first Chief Operating
Officer, . . . took steps to break down internal silos and
create a culture of collaboration, . . . recruited more staff
with specialized expertise and real world experience,
expanded our training . . . .”63The human resources
Volume 30 • Number 4 • April 2011

frame will remain in the spotlight as organizational
change at the SEC continues.
The second frame in Bolman and Deal’s model is
labeled the “structural frame.” It focuses on “alignment
and clarity” in the organizational structure.64 Structural
changes at the SEC have been significant65 and are
ongoing. For example, the Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations is overhauling its examination process as a result of a self-assessment and the
Dodd-Frank Act.66 In addition, Dodd-Frank’s creation
of the Investor Advisory Committee and Office of
the Investor Advocate resulted in mandatory structural change at the SEC.67 Structural change has
been a central feature of Chairman Schapiro’s reform
efforts.
We’re continuing to make significant progress in
reforming how the SEC operates. Since 2009, the
agency has carried out a comprehensive review
and restructuring of its two largest programs—
enforcement and examinations—to ensure effective performance. The Enforcement Division has
streamlined its procedures to bring cases more
swiftly, removed a layer of management, created national specialized units, and added new
staff with new skills to pursue complex fraud
and market abuses. More recently, the SEC’s
examinations unit restructured its exam program after a top-to-bottom review, becoming
more risk-based in its approach, enhancing staff
training, and installing better systems to support
examiners.68
Inevitably, the SEC will be compelled to continue
to realign its regulatory configuration as the provisions
of Dodd-Frank (including potentially implementation
of the recommendations made in the BCG report69)
and political changes in Washington take full effect,
underscoring the ongoing importance of the structural
frame.
The “political frame” is Bolman and Deal’s third
frame.70 In analyzing organizational change using this
frame, the change leader must be attentive to “conflict
and arenas.”71 In the Villanova Law Review article, I
assessed the SEC’s leadership in employing this frame
by looking at evidence of internal conflict at the SEC
(of which there was little) and concluded that “[i]t
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 7
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is and will be important for Chairman Schapiro and
Director Khuzami to react to the inevitable clashes that
arise in their organizational change efforts by creating
‘processes of negotiation and bargaining where settlements and agreements can be hammered out.’”72
At the time that earlier article was written and even
later when the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, the interests of the executive and legislative branches and the
SEC seemed to be well aligned. As noted at the outset
in this article and as addressed below, that situation
has now changed markedly. Conflict relating to the
SEC’s reform efforts has begun to arise from external
sources—namely, Republicans in the U.S. Congress.
Highly publicized issues that have created friction
in the current political climate include the earlierreferenced handling of potential conflicts of interest
involving former General Counsel David Becker’s
inheritance of funds generated from the illegal activities of Bernard Madoff and public reports regarding
the use of agency computers by SEC staff to review
pornographic material.73 So far, there is no indication
that SEC leaders have allowed brewing political conflict
among the branches of government to permanently or
substantially interrupt or reverse institutional reform.
It remains to be seen whether political conflict will
develop further and become entrenched and, if it does,
whether Chairman Schapiro and other SEC leaders
will be able to prevent a full-scale battle that derails
organizational change. If they focus effectively on the
political frame, SEC leaders will attempt to skillfully
and constructively channel the discord to a confined
arena as a means of insulting SEC institutional reform
as much as possible from the political conflict. We are in
the midst of observing the SEC leaders’ engagement of
the political frame in this new environment. It, too, will
be in the forefront as reform continues.
The fourth and final frame for decision making by
change leaders is the “symbolic frame,” which addresses
the need for change leaders to focus attention on the
“meaning and purpose” that constituents see in and
derive from the reform measures. The destruction
of negative symbols like Bernie Madoff and other
SEC enforcement and rulemaking failures has been
important to early reform efforts at the SEC.74 While
continuing to focus on the destruction of these and
other harmful reminders of institutional and regulatory
breakdowns at the SEC before and in the financial crisis,
8 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

reform at the SEC has also begun to center around an
important positive symbol: a single, highly integrated
market, with the same protections for all, regardless of
sophistication or wherewithal.75 This symbol embodies
the SEC’s core values of investor advocacy and protection.76 To date, the SEC has been able to harmoniously
and consistently position its institutional reform agenda
in a manner that reifies this symbol.
The execution of the SEC’s operations during the
reform period, however, has not always taken full
account of the importance of this symbol. In the eyes
of some, for example, the SEC’s settlement of its case
against Goldman Sachs adversely impacted the symbol
of a single market in which all are protected,77 even
though Goldman Sachs paid $550 million to settle
the case and acknowledged wrongdoing.78 The SEC’s
pursuit of Goldman Sachs in a civil enforcement
action had been viewed by many as emblematic of the
strength of its overarching pan-investor mission, and its
settlement was viewed as compromising that mission
and settlement of the case was viewed as compromising that mission. Professor Larry Mitchell eloquently
expressed that view in an opinion piece published by
the Financial Times.
[T]he SEC’s Goldman suit, launched only in
April, seemed to signal that the agency was back
in the fight. It was hoped that a victory against
Goldman would do more than redress a fraud; it
would set a wider regulatory precedent that its
manner of doing business was socially and economically unacceptable. It would also have held
out the possibility of beginning necessary cultural
changes on Wall Street that might at least diminish
the chances of future crises, while demonstrating
that the SEC’s concern with market safety and
fairness was more important than recouping a few
bucks for big boy banks.
But once again, the SEC disappointed. The settlement, which was one of the highest paid by a
US company, looks tough. But in truth, the SEC
caved. It let Goldman, which decided that fighting the commission was not in its self-interest,
effectively pay off the government with what
amounted, in the long run, to pocket change.
The SEC did so without making any management changes, or without a confession of all but
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the slightest regret. By accepting this settlement
rather than holding out for a prosecution, or at
least by fighting for a decent interval, the commission signalled it is still unwilling to carve out
a wider regulatory role. More important, perhaps,
it signalled to Wall Street that it has little to fear
from SEC lawsuits.79
Not all commentators share Professor Mitchell’s
view, however. Some believe that the SEC’s case against
Goldman Sachs was weak and that the settlement was
wise and enabled the SEC to gain political capital—or
at least save face.80 Still, coming less than one year after
judicial and journalistic rebukes of the SEC’s settlement
of its enforcement action against Bank of America,81
the SEC may have missed an opportunity to use its
enforcement operations to support the symbolic core of
its institutional reforms. SEC leaders may have failed to
assess or miscalculated in their assessment of the symbolic
frame. If the nature and effect of the SEC’s operations are
inconsistent with the nature and effect of its institutional
reforms, the latter are unlikely to be successful. As organizational change continues, it would behoove the SEC
to give additional weight to the symbolic frame in its
continuing reform efforts and consider linkages between
organizational changes and operational decisions.
The SEC’s failure to fully shake off the devastating
effects of Bernard Madoff ’s long-term, high-profile
securities fraud scheme is further evidence that it needs
to continue to focus on the symbolic frame to assure
the success of its operational reforms. The recent disclosure of the financial interest of former SEC General
Counsel David Becker in the Madoff affair has revived
this negative symbol and presented obstacles to continued transformations in SEC operations. This shadow
needs to be cast off as soon as possible, and SEC leaders
have a role in achieving that result.
In the Villanova Law Review article, I noted that
the SEC leadership appeared to have engaged in a
multi-frame analysis and action plan. Training and
hiring—focusing on human resources—was part of
the reform effort. The SEC was restructured in a
number of ways to better achieve reform objectives.
And publicized facts suggest that Chairman Schapiro
and Director Khuzami understood symbols—at least
negative ones—that would be impacted by the changes
they were making at the SEC.
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As noted, there are ongoing signs that the SEC’s
leadership is paying attention to the four frames
highlighted by Bolman and Deal. Evidence of a multiframed approach includes continued attentiveness to
training and other HR issues, a sustained focus on possible structural changes, and concern about the capacity
of change to reinforce and destroy important symbols
(despite confounding operational decisions). Perhaps
the most serious concerns relate to the political frame.
There is no firm evidence yet that change momentum
at the SEC has been halted by current political conflict
internal or external to the SEC, but the SEC’s current
funding issues threaten that change momentum. Given
existing political realities, the pace of change at the SEC
is likely to slow if the political conflict that underlies
weak congressional support for the SEC continues or
deepens. There is undoubtedly an ongoing need for
leaders at the SEC to engage in multi-frame decisionmaking that takes all four of Bolman and Deal’s frames
into account.
Potential Effects of SEC
Funding Shortfalls
The current Republican House of Representatives
represents a potential impediment to successful reform
at the SEC. The most serious threat is the failure of the
current Congress to fully fund the SEC’s organizational
reforms, including those mandated under the DoddFrank Act. What a difference an election makes . . . .
In May 2010, before the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act, Chairman Schapiro urged independent funding
for the SEC.
A key provision in the legislation would provide
independent funding for the SEC. It’s a provision that guarantees independence, enables us to
engage in long-term planning, and helps us to
close the resource gap between us and the Wall
Street firms we regulate.
Most every other federal financial regulator is
independently funded and I believe the one
agency that is charged with protecting investors
should be independently funded as well.
I hope that Congress resists efforts by those in the
financial world who would rather see us weakened, than strengthened.82
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Arguments for authorization of self-funding for
the SEC are compelling and precede the enactment
of the Dodd-Frank Act.83 Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act
did not make the SEC a self-funded agency. Instead,
it afforded the SEC certain new or preferential funding mechanisms, sources, and procedures.84 Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the overall budget of the SEC was
scheduled to increase substantially from 2010 through
2015 to allow for full implementation of the SEC’s
increased obligations.85 Preparations for use of the
anticipated funds began immediately.86
The planning for additional funds in those summer
months gave way to planning for fiscal restraint in
the late fall and winter, however. New hires, offices,
and programs were curtailed when it became apparent that the Obama administration’s plan for funding
SEC institutional and operational reforms would
be rejected by the new Congress.87 Currently, the
SEC is being funded under a continuing resolution
that maintains the agency’s support at October 2010
levels.88 Among the unfunded organizational changes:
certain mandates under the Dodd-Frank Act.89 As
many have pointed out, the burdens of the DoddFrank Act were foisted upon an SEC that already
was underfunded given the scope of its mandate.90
Although the SEC is meeting its obligations under
some of its Dodd-Frank mandates, it is (at least in
some cases) diverting funds from other projects to do
so.91 In addition, the SEC is behind on a number of its
financial reform projects.92 Funding levels currently
endorsed by congressional Republicans represent
significant threats to SEC operations, according to
Chairman Schapiro.93 The recently released report of
BCG on the SEC’s operations confirms the agency
lacks adequate funding to accomplish its objectives
under exiting law and regulation.94 The SEC, having
been revived by its change leaders and the provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act, has been set up for failure in
the post-Dodd-Frank era.
As this article is being written, the funding situation has become dire. Interested persons and groups are
beginning to step up and publicly plead with Congress
to increase funding to the SEC to fulfill the promise of
the Dodd-Frank Act. Of course, the SEC itself is among
those urging additional funding for its operations.
Chairman Schapiro, in particular, makes a compelling
case. After making observations about trading volume,
10 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

workforce size, and comparative technology budgets,
she recently said the following:
[W]hile we appreciate the need to find inefficiencies and leverage resources—which we have been
doing and will continue to do—we also note that
last year alone we sent the U.S. treasury nearly
$300 million more in collected transaction fees
than we spent. And, we will continue to pay our
own way in future years.
Furthermore, in the past year, we returned more
than $2 billion to harmed investors—twice our
annual budget.
So we need to ask ourselves if we want our
market analysts to continue to use decades-old
technology to recreate market events or to monitor trading that occurs at the speed of light.
We need to ask ourselves if we want our chief
securities regulator to have to pull the plug on
data management systems and on a digital forensics lab needed to recreate the data that sophisticated fraudsters leave on hard drives and iPhones.
We need to ask ourselves if we want to turn away
the influx of market and economic experts willing to complement our existing talent and join
our ranks.
These are the questions we’re confronting even as
we implement our new responsibilities for hedge
funds, derivatives and credit rating agencies.95
The North American Securities Administrators
Association has joined in the call for increased funding
to enable the SEC to fulfill its obligations under the
Dodd-Frank Act.96
Chairman Shapiro recently testified before Congress
on President Obama’s requested appropriations for the
SEC.97 If the current underfunding is not mitigated or
corrected, the SEC will be forced to continue to rob
certain programs, forego some rulemaking, enforcement,
and other activities, and limit new reforms (including
many under the Dodd-Frank Act). Republicans in
Congress may effectively be able to achieve through the
power of the purse what they cannot politically achieve
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through new legislation: a repeal of some or all of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
Republicans, who largely opposed Dodd-Frank,
now control the House of Representatives, and
many have already called for its repeal. If repeal
isn’t possible—and since Democrats still control
the Senate and the White House, it isn’t—then
starving the SEC of money to enforce the law
is a logical Plan B. Indeed, incoming House
Majority Leader Eric Cantor recently said that
denying funds to the SEC and other agencies is
“what the American people are expecting.” He
stated: “We certainly have the power to go about
denying [President Obama’s] agencies the funding
they need.”98
In the face of a potential de facto repeal of the DoddFrank Act, the entire program of institutional and
regulatory responses to the financial crisis is at stake.
Although some of these responses may be unnecessary or inefficient, underfunding does not target these
weaknesses. Instead, it nullifies reform haphazardly. This
article does not aspire to addressing the many potential
effects of that risky course of action. However, in light
of the analysis I employ in the Villanova Law Review
article and here, it seems important to briefly relate the
SEC’s current underfunding crisis to its institutional
reform efforts. That is all I seek to do here.
The Future of Institutional
Reform at the SEC
A lack of funding does not change the attributes of
successful change leaders, but it does test them. Wartime
leadership and problem-finding skills are, if anything,
more important in a limited-resource environment.
Similarly, the nature and quality of a successful change
leader’s actions are no different in an era of underfunding and arguably become even more important when
financial support is lacking.
Yet long-term underfunding will prevent even
informed and motivated change leaders from meeting
their ultimate objectives for organizational transformation. At some level of underfunding over some
period of time, the SEC will be unable to extend
or even continue its institutional reform efforts. The
decisions that the SEC Commissioners will have to
make on where to invest limited financial, human, and
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technological resources will be exceedingly difficult
and distract from the ability of the SEC to carry out
its statutory mandate. The only continuing “reform”
at the SEC under those circumstances would be more
extreme cost cutting and austerity-oriented resource
allocation.
Even if the SEC can continue to pursue some
reforms in the absence of full funding, the probability
for success of those reforms will be significantly diminished; it will become increasingly difficult for the SEC
to anchor organizational change to the SEC’s highest
value—investor advocacy and protection—because
support for that value will be weak. U.S. Senator
Tim Johnson alluded to the SEC’s potential decreased
capacity for investor advocacy and protection when
he offered the following comments after the Senate’s
December 2010 passage of the continuing resolution
providing level funding for the SEC:
I remain concerned with what passage of this
measure, and the defeat of the annual appropriations bill last week, could mean to implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform law.
The success of this law and its ability to protect
consumers and investors hinges on Congress
providing increased funding for agencies like the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Under
this funding bill, these agencies could face a lack
of resources that ultimately leaves investors more
vulnerable.99
SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar concurs with
Senator Johnson’s view that investors will suffer if the
SEC does not receive additional funding.100 “Our staff
deserves a well-funded agency that provides the tools
they need to protect investors and fulfill the agency’s
mission. Investors expect no less.”101 Inconsistencies
between the actions of SEC leaders and the SEC’s core
values may threaten the success of recent and planned
future organizational change.
In this difficult fiscal environment, the importance of
assessing potential organizational changes using a multiframe approach cannot be overstated. Changes in the
SEC’s reform plan are likely to have marked effects on
human resources and the structure of the agency. The
enhanced staff knowledge and skills in which the SEC
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has recently invested will be at risk, and revisiting structural issues at the SEC is likely to cause uncertainty and
distrust. SEC leaders will have to guard against adverse
effects in these areas as much as possible in order to
have any lasting success with their reform agenda. Both
the political frame and symbolic frame also will present
challenges. It will be difficult for SEC Commissioners
to constrain conflict arising out of inadequate funding so that it does not interrupt reform efforts, and (as
already noted) changes in the SEC’s plan for reform
would certainly impact investor advocacy and protection and other key symbols. It will be challenging for
SEC leaders to minimize both damaging effects arising from political controversy and negative impacts on
important symbols.
The vicissitudes of politics and the congressional
appropriations process are unlikely to destroy the SEC.
After all, the SEC has faced significant budget challenges in the past and has survived (and gone on to
thrive).102 It seems that Chairman Schapiro, Director
Khuzami, and others in leadership positions at the SEC
are prepared to soldier on and accept the continuing
challenges that change leadership presents, even if the
SEC’s reform plans are not adequately funded.
In and in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress
first rejected self-funding for the SEC and then failed
to appropriate additional funds to the SEC to support
institutional change. Congress appears to be throwing
the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. By failing to
fully fund the SEC’s operations, Congress now threatens
more than the reforms instituted in the Dodd-Frank
Act. It also may derail successful organizational reform
already in process at the SEC before the adoption of that
Act—reform that directly responded to acknowledged
weaknesses in the then existing regulatory framework.
This seems like a needlessly perilous path.
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